

MEMORANDUM

Phoenix Merchant Partners — Research

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
“Private Credit Stress Concentrates in Smaller Funds” ... a review of the facts

Apollo’s recent *Daily Spark* argues that private-credit stress concentrates in smaller funds, which it attributes to lending to smaller, weaker companies and holding less diversified portfolios, leaving little cushion when credits deteriorate.¹ We agree that dispersion in outcomes is widening, but read the evidence differently. The claim of a particular stress in smaller funds, in our opinion, (i) is not robust in the presented data, (ii) understates the structural and funding-model risks borne by large lenders, and (iii) points away from the software sector concentration that is the actual driver of stress today.

1. The chart does not establish a robust size effect

The claim rests on MSCI’s exhibit “In private credit, size has meant relative safety.”² We reconstructed and tested its two series³. The small-minus-big gap in loans marked below 50% is highly persistent – close to a random walk, in which a rising line can appear by chance – so the appropriate test looks at quarter-to-quarter changes.

Figure 1: Robustness of “size has meant relative safety” claim



There the gap drifts up ~0.56 pp per quarter against a standard error of ~0.26: a signal-to-noise ratio of only ~2.1, barely past the ~2.0 that marks significance, with a 95% range (~0.01 to 1.1 pp) that nearly touches zero. The full-sample average gap is essentially nil and the entire effect sits in the last 6–8 quarters.

Critically, MSCI publishes no sample sizes, dispersion, or confidence bands, so a few impaired funds could be moving the aggregate. On the evidence shown, this is a suggestive recent signal, not an established size effect.

2. The structural fault lines run the other way

Scale carries its own concentration risk. To deploy multi-billion-size vehicles, the largest lenders increase deal size and focus on the upper middle-market, competing directly with broadly syndicated loans. Origination is driven by large sponsors’ needs and concentrated in PE-heavy industries (incl. software)⁴. Rapid underwriting and deployment across multi-lender groups results in significant portfolio overlap⁴, and competitive pressure that led to the prevalence of covenant-lite structures through the larger end of the market (~30% of upper-MM deals, >\$50m EBITDA, lack maintenance covenants)⁵

It is well established in investment literature that expertise-intensive, capacity-constrained asset classes exhibit decreasing returns to scale⁶. Smaller lenders can build differentiated portfolios by operating below the mega-deal threshold, sourcing proprietary, often non-sponsor opportunities across a broader range of industries, preserving underwriting intensity, and securing stronger lender protections (incl. covenants, tangible collateral) through less competitive transactions.

We believe the more relevant differentiator today is the funding model rather than fund size. Much of recent growth among the largest private credit platforms has been driven by retail wealth channels, which are more susceptible to sentiment-driven redemption pressures, as demonstrated by the recent experience of several flagship non-traded vehicles⁷.

¹ Apollo, “The Daily Spark” (T. Slok, Chief Economist), apolloacademy.com/the-daily-spark, June 2026.

² MSCI, “The State of Private Markets 2026,” theme 03 (Liquidity), Q3 2025 MSCI Private Capital Transparency data.

³ Phoenix Merchant Partners, internal analysis (June 2026): Series from MSCI exhibit, tested with a unit-root-robust drift test. Digitization error $\approx \pm 0.5$ –1 pp.

⁴ Phoenix Merchant Partners, “Diversification in Institutional Direct Lending” (June 2026), University of Chicago, “The Lending Technology of Direct Lenders in Private Credit” (Jan 2026) and Raymond James, “3Q25 BDC Portfolio Overlap” (Dec 2025).

⁵ Covenant Lite Substack, <https://covenantlite.substack.com/p/covenant-lite-22-guardrails-gone>, June 2025

⁶ Berk & Green, “Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets”, 2024; Pastor, Stambaugh & Taylor, “Scale and Skill in Active Management”, 2015

⁷ Bloomberg, “Apollo Caps Private Credit Fund After 17% Request to Exit”, June 2026, Apollo Debt Solutions BDC: Q2 2026 repurchase requests ~16.8% of shares against a 5% quarterly cap, met ~45% pro-rata

By contrast, smaller institutional funds backed by long-term committed capital do not face this structural liquidity pressure, irrespective of the size of their borrowers. Framing the problem around fund and/or borrower size understates both the sector concentration and the redemption fragility that sit disproportionately with the largest, partially retail-funded platforms.

3. Where the stress sits: Software, in the largest books

The most systemic strand of today's distress is software, and the bulk of that exposure, including the marquee mega-deals, sit in the large, sponsor-driven books⁸.

Under deployment pressure, the largest lenders financed the 2021–2022 vintage of software LBOs at high leverage, frequently underwritten against recurring revenue rather than EBITDA. With benchmark rates still elevated, all-in coupons in the low double digits now consume the bulk of these borrowers' cash flow, while generative-AI disruption pressures the terminal value of legacy SaaS. As equity cushions erode, sponsors grow reluctant to inject fresh capital, leaving the lender holding a leveraged, underperforming asset.

Medallia is emblematic: Taken private by a large PE-Manager in 2021, its PIK toggle was not extended and expired at the end of 2025, the resulting switch to cash interest lifted debt service to ~\$300m against ~\$200m of earnings; by mid-2026 a lender group took control in a debt-for-equity restructuring, crystallizing losses. It is one of several 2021/22 software mega-deals, held across large direct lending platforms. Combined, the 15 largest transactions are estimated to account for ~\$30bn of debt financing, illustrating the potential for correlated portfolio stress across large funds⁹.

Smaller lenders, particularly those prioritizing proprietary non-sponsor origination, typically do not participate in mega-deals. Their portfolios are built through directly sourcing across a broader range of industries, enabling greater selectivity and stronger structural protections. This approach generally results in lower software exposure and greater reliance on asset collateral with demonstrable recovery value, rather than enterprise-value or ARR-based underwriting.

In Conclusion

Outcomes in private credit are dispersing, and some smaller managers will struggle. But the specific proposition that “Stress Concentrates in Smaller Funds” is not supported by evidence. On the data presented it appears a suggestive signal, not an established effect, and runs against three features of the current credit cycle,

- A. The structural pressures that push scaled lenders into the most competitive end of the market
- B. The redemption fragility of partially retail-funded vehicles, and
- C. The concentration of 2021/22 vintage software exposure in the largest direct lending books.

In our view, size is the wrong dimension. Rather, underwriting quality, lender protections, sector concentration, funding model, and, importantly, diversification across origination channels can explain a greater share of dispersion than AUM.

A portfolio sourced through a single, sponsor-driven pipeline inherits the overlap and common-factor risk now surfacing in software. Whatever its size; broadening origination, for example toward bank-sourced, non-sponsor lending, widens sector exposure and tilts the portfolio toward more robust collateral and protections. That, instead of fund size, is the more durable risk lesson of this cycle.

Prepared by Phoenix Merchant Partners for discussion. Not investment advice. Contains forward-looking statements and third-party data not independently verified; figures from a reconstructed chart and secondary sources should be confirmed against primary data.

⁸ S&P Global, “Software debt sell-off signals cyclical turn for private equity and credit”, March 2026.

⁹ Phoenix Merchant Partners, internal research, June 2026.

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